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National Security Without Secret Laws: How Other Nations Balance National 






One of the hallmarks of a democratic nation is that there are no secret laws.
1
  Yet parts of 
the George W. Bush administration‘s legal policy that governed aspects of the war on terror were 
laid out in non-public opinions issued the Department of Justice‘s Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC).  Many of those opinions, which are almost always binding on the executive branch and 
are used to provide legal comfort to government officials in the form of protection against future 
investigation or prosecution, are still secret or were kept secret for years before being leaked or 
disseminated to Congress and the public. 
 
Numerous scholars and politicians called for the disclosure of these OLC opinions,
2
 and 
others similarly argued that secrecy in the development and implementation of legal policy runs 
afoul of the rule of law, compromises the quality of the OLC‘s legal opinions, and undermines 
confidence in the integrity of executive branch constitutional interpretation.  The Bush 
administration claimed that greater disclosure would have jeopardized U.S. national security 
interests—a claim that is undermined by the experiences of other nations that have been able to 
both deal with national security concerns and maintain a greater level of transparency.  This 
Issue Brief buttresses the calls for timely and structured disclosure of OLC opinions (on which 
the administration actually relies upon in executing its legal policy) by considering how other 
nations that face severe national security threats maintain greater transparency and public 
accessibility for legal policy related to national security matters. 
 
Part I of this Issue Brief provides a short overview of the problems inherent in the 
politicization of OLC.  Part II describes some of the Bush administration justifications for non-
disclosure of OLC memoranda and addresses the concerns underlying the justifications.  Part III 
uses the comparative examples of India, Israel, and the United Kingdom to illustrate how other 
nations facing serious national security challenges have opted for a significantly more 
transparent model of developing and implementing legal policy related to national security 
issues.  Part IV examines whether the case for OLC reform can still be made given the Obama 
administration‘s disclosure of numerous Bush-era OLC opinions.  This Issue Brief concludes by 
urging serious consideration of structural reform to ensure objectivity, transparency, and political 
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2
 See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, Dawn Johnsen, et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (2004), reprinted 




I. The Politicization of the Office of Legal Counsel 
 
One of the fundamental responsibilities of the U.S. Attorney General and his or her 
subordinates in the OLC is to provide legal advice and counsel to the administration.
3
  As the 
chief legal officer of the United States, the Attorney General has an obligation to uphold the rule 
of law by providing the best possible legal counsel to the President and administration and to 
limit the effect of political pressures to mold his or her opinion to facilitate the political goals of 
the President.
4
  The importance of adhering to the rule of law is compounded when the legal 
opinions offered by the Attorney General are used as legal comfort:  protecting government 





However, numerous obstacles exist to the OLC offering its most impartial, and arguably 
best, assessment of the law, including the inherent conflicts of interest which arise when the 
administration attempts to influence the OLC to issue opinions that are politically advantageous 
to the administration.  Historically, this political pressure has been brought to bear during times 
of war or armed conflict, raising doubts as to whether any administration can achieve the ―best 
practice‖ of offering non-politicized legal advice at all times.
6
   
 
During the seven years of the Bush administration after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, the OLC became highly politicized and drafted numerous memoranda and legal opinions 
which engendered criticism on two fronts: first, the substance of the policies promulgated,
7
 and 
second, the process by which the OLC developed and implemented its legal policy.
8
  Key 
memoranda which strongly influenced the administration‘s prosecution of the war on terror 
included an extraordinarily narrow definition of ―torture‖ as applied to detainees
9
 and the 
provision of legal comfort to those interrogators who violated federal and international law.
10
 
                                                 
3
 NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S OFFICE, 1789-1990 
1-2 (Univ. Press of Kansas 1992).  See Dawn Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on 
Executive Power, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1559, 1577 (2007) (noting that the opinions generated by the Office of Legal 
Counself (OLC) are generally considered binding on the executive branch, unless the President or Attorney General 
disagrees based on a differing legal interpretation). 
4
 Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT‘L SECURITY L. & POL‘Y 455, 
464-66 (2005) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003)) (arguing that the appropriate ethical 
standard for legal advice rendered by OLC lawyers is such that ―the lawyer‘s role is not simply to spin out creative 
legal arguments.  It is to offer her assessment of the law as objectively as possible.‖). 
5
 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 23, 96 
(W.W. Norton & Co. 2007) (noting that it is ―practically impossible to prosecute someone who relied in good faith 
on an [OLC] opinion, even if the opinion turns out to be wrong‖).  
6
 See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 2, at 1603 (calling for the OLC to maintain a non-politicized stance in developing 
legal policy). 
7
 See e.g., Editorial, The Torturers’ Manifesto, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at WK9 (criticizing recently disclosed 
OLC memoranda in which legal comfort was offered to interrogators using techniques on detainees such as 
waterboarding, sleep deprivation, slamming into a wall and locking in a box with insects). 
8
 See generally Johnsen, supra note 3; Goldsmith, supra note 5; Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the 
Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1250–58 (2006) (noting the executive branch‘s use of constitutional 
avoidance theory to assert its right to circumvent the parameters of FISA); H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive and 
the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. L.J. 1313 (2006). 
9
 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, 




Not only did these memoranda stake new legal ground for the administration, but their 
effect was compounded by unprecedented secrecy within the Department of Justice and 
administration as a whole, and to other branches of government and the public.
11
  The 
nondisclosure of legal opinions and the opacity of the OLC created an environment in which 
other changes could be effected without outside oversight, including political influence on 
content and conclusions of the legal opinions drafted by the OLC.
12
  The lack of information 
disclosure led to the breakdown of other norms, such as appropriate supervision within the 
OLC
13
 and the use of external checks, including consultation with the general counsels for 
relevant administrative departments, in developing legal policy. 
 
II. Bush Administration Justifications for Nondisclosure 
 
National security interests demand a heightened awareness of how sensitive information 
is treated, since the President has legitimate needs to act quickly and discreetly in times of war.  
Equally legitimate, however, is the need for the public and Congress to understand the country‘s 
legal policy vis-à-vis national security matters.  The Bush administration justified its 
nondisclosure of legal policy by insisting, among other arguments, that nondisclosure of legal 
policy is necessary to maintain the integrity of U.S. national security interests.
14
  The Bush 
administration often offered the defense that additional information about the content of OLC 
opinions would empower terrorists planning to attack the U.S.
15
  Former Attorney General 




                                                                                                                                                             
Memorandum].  The Bybee Memorandum was superseded, in part, by another memorandum, drafted by the acting 
head of OLC Daniel Levin, that addressed the applicability of the Convention Against Torture and disavowed some 
of the conclusions made in the Bybee Memorandum.  See Memorandum to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., 
Legal Standards Applicable Under U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memorandum]. 
10
 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep‘t 
of Def., Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 2003) 
[hereinafterYoo Memorandum]. 
11
 See Oversight of the Department of Justice:  Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 3(2008) 
[hereinafter Oversight Hearing](statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.) (noting the 
practices of the Justice Department leading it to be a ―department of cloaking misguided policies under veiled 
secrecy, leaving Congress, the courts, but especially the American people in the dark.‖). 
12
 Oversight Hearing, supra note 11, at 72 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.) (―I‘m 
worried we‘re not getting enough clarity on critical issues.  We have heard reference to legal opinions, to 
justifications, facts that remain hidden from the Congress, the American people.  And it‘s a hallmark of our 
democracy that we say what our laws are and what conduct they prohibit.  We‘ve seen what‘s happened when 
hidden decisions are made in secret memos and that‘s held from the American people, held from their 
representatives here in Congress.  It erodes our liberties, but in undermines our values as a nation of laws.‖). 
13
 Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 167. 
14
 See Johnsen, supra note 3, at 1565; Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, Prepared Statement (Feb. 
6, 2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/020606gonzales.html (last visited March 3, 2008). 
15
 Carol D. Leonig & Eric Kich, U.S. Seeks Silence on CIA Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2006, at A1.  See Heidi 
Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1049, 1056 (2008) (―the administration has offered no explanation of the purported dangers of revealing the 
program‘s very existence beyond the vague assertion that, while terrorists surely already know that the United States 
can survey their conversation, knowing about the program would remind them of this fact and might lead them to 
infer that surveillance is broader than they had assumed‖). 
16
 Wartime Executive Power and National Security Administration’s Surveillance Authority: Hearing Before S. 




The Bush administration Department of Justice used the fact that national security was its 
top priority to support extensive nondisclosure.  For example, a March 2003 memorandum 
authored by Office of Legal Counsel attorney John Yoo provided legal comfort to interrogators 
of detainees captured during the war on terror.
17
  This memorandum sought to insulate U.S. 
government officials from prosecution or other legal liability if they used coercive interrogation 
techniques such as waterboarding, head-slapping, and exposure of prisoners to extreme 
temperatures.
18
  The existence of this memorandum was known outside of the Bush 
administration for several years, but the administration refused requests to disclose the 
memorandum—based on purported national security concerns associated with the release of the 
opinion.
19
  The memorandum had been classified to prevent disclosure, but was declassified and 
disclosed in April 2008 in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.
20
  It is unclear what 
legitimate basis existed for the memorandum to be withheld from public scrutiny, since it 
contained neither sensitive personal information nor details about specific intelligence-gathering 
programs. 
 
The Bush administration‘s other proffered justification for nondisclosure turned on a 
unilateralist reading of the unitary executive theory, which held that the President alone has the 
authority to decide how the administration will fulfill its constitutional obligations.
21
  The Bush 
administration relied on textual arguments such as the Commander-in-Chief clause and the 
Vesting Clause of the Constitution to claim unilateral jurisdiction over war-related decision 
making.
22
  This approach discounted the fact that the framers of the Constitution and early 
administrations emphasized pragmatic power-sharing between Congress and the President, 
particularly with regard to the actions of the Attorney General, an office adopted from British 
and state colonial governments whose original goal was to provide counsel for both the President 
and Congress.
23
  This approach also inappropriately set aside Congress‘s constitutionally granted 
war powers, including Congress‘s right to regulate captures during war and to conduct oversight 
of the President even in matters of national security.
24
   
 
The claim that disclosure of legal policies is unnecessary and unwise because it would 
jeopardize U.S. national security interests is questionable, given both the experiences of the U.S. 
and other nations, as well as serious concerns about the maintenance of the rule of law.  First, the 
Bush administration offered no credible evidence that disclosure will harm or has harmed U.S. 
national security interests; in fact, it offered no evidence that the disclosure of the OLC 
                                                                                                                                                             
137.  See id. at 19, 41, 76-77, 80, 83, 130-131, 138 for further pragmatic arguments in favor of non-disclosure of 
national security-related legal policy to Congress. 
17
 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep‘t 




 Dan Eggen & Josh White, Memo: Laws Didn’t Apply to Interrogators, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2008, at A1. 
20
 Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Secret Bush Administration Torture Memo Released Today in 
Response to ACLU Lawsuit (Apr. 1, 2008). 
21
 See, e.g., Yoo memorandum, supra note 17; see also James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16 2005, at A1. 
22
 See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of the War Powers, 
84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996). 
23
 Baker, supra note 3, at 37-38. 
24




memoranda that were initially withheld from public scrutiny negatively impacted U.S. national 
security programs.  Repeated claims of a need for secrecy based on national security concerns 
ultimately undermined the Bush administration‘s claim, with more evidence pointing to secrecy 
being maintained primarily for political purposes.
25
  Further, the Bush administration failed to 
make its case as to why legal policies governing the war on terror must be afforded more secrecy 
than domestic criminal laws and procedural rules.  If the U.S. or any democratic nation chooses 
to rely on secret laws and thus deviate so substantially from the general edicts of the rule of law, 
the public deserves a credible and clear explanation as to why that deviation is necessary. 
 
III. Transparency of Legal Policy in Other Nations 
 
The claim that national security threats require secret law and an unprecedented lack of 
transparency is undermined by comparison with other nations.  Other countries that face serious 
national security issues have no mechanism or allowance for secret legal policies to govern 
national security matters; instead, several nations publicize, disseminate and publicly debate the 
same type of legal policy that was withheld from public scrutiny by the OLC during the Bush 
administration.  A comparative perspective, even of nations with significant different 







India has been coping with serious national security concerns, both internal and external, 
for the last 60 years.
27
  By some accounts, India is the nation that has faced the highest number 
of terrorist acts in recent years.
28
  The similarities with the U.S. national security landscape are 
noteworthy.  The central government of India has responsibility for developing laws and policies 
to preserve the national security of India,
29
 and the country goes through periods of conflict in 
which its otherwise supposedly impartial and unbiased legal policy becomes politicized and 
prone to government overreaching in the areas of civil rights and civil liberties.
30
  In the last nine 
years, both India and the U.S. have experienced a period of intense focus on national security in 
the wake of significant terrorist attacks.  India passed a number of strong antiterrorism laws in 
recent years which grant additional authority and power to the central government to maintain 
national security.  In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and attacks on Indian 
government buildings soon afterward,
31
 the Indian Parliament enacted the Prevention of 
                                                 
25
 Editorial, Politics, Pure and Cynical, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A22. 
26
 Kim Lane Scheppele, We Are All Post-9/11 Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 609 (2006) (noting the value of 
considering other countries‘ experiences with balancing national security with other constitutional interests). 
27
 See Anil Kalhan, et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism and Security Laws in India, 20 COLUM. 
J. ASIAN L., Fall 2006, at 1, 99. 
28
 E.g., Arun Venugopal, India Worst Hit by Terrorism in 2004, INDIA ABROAD, Aug. 19, 2005, at A14. 
29
 INDIA CONST., art. 246, List I, §§ 1-2, 2A; id. at  List III, §§ 1-2. 
30
  For example, the Defence of India Act of 1962 authorized the central and state governments to broaden their use 
of preventative detention beyond ordinary laws as a means to quell potential uprisings against the government and in 
response to hostilities in the Jammu and Kashmir region.  See Kalhan, supra note 27, at 132-33 (citing VENKAT 
IYER, STATES OF EMERGENCY: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 109 (2000)). 
31
 The Indian parliament building in New Delhi was attacked in December 2001, with 12 people killed and 22 




Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA).  Under POTA, the government, in conducting antiterrorist 
activities and in case of a self-determined emergency, was authorized to set aside ordinary legal 
protections with regard to wiretapping any person within India without authorization, extend the 
duration and scope of preventative detention measures, and deny arrested suspects access to 
counsel.
32
  Some antiterrorist activities legally authorized under POTA parallel what was initially 
authorized under the USA Patriot Act, particularly in terms of allowing for enhanced 




The responsibility for the creation of legal policy in India is diffuse, with the parliament 
having the ultimate ability to set the law, while the prime minister and administrative 
departments play central, but not decisive, roles.  In addition, certain critical issues can be 
referred to external committees and commissions.  For example, an early iteration of some of the 
POTA policies was a 2000 report
34
 drafted by the Indian Law Commission,
35
 a nonpartisan 
commission of respected lawyers and jurists who respond to government requests for legal 
recommendations.  This referral reflects the fact that the executive branch viewed the task of 
drafting legal policies for at least some national security issues to warrant thoughtful and 
apolitical analysis to structure and recommend long-term responses to threats of terrorism.  The 
2000 report contained recommendations that the parliament strengthen the central government‘s 
power to conduct antiterrorism operations, primarily in light of ongoing domestic unrest that 
could provoke a national crisis.  Even at this early stage, transparency and public opportunity for 
comment were considered.  The Law Commission, in accordance with its own policies, 
circulated the report to the public through its website and distributed the report to government 




POTA‘s enactment (and eventual repeal) illustrates the important role that transparency 
can play in permitting political accountability.  After the September 11 terrorist attacks in the 
U.S., the Indian parliament began debate on whether to pass the Law Commission‘s 
recommendations from the 2000 report into law.  In the meantime, because of the perceived 
immediacy of the need for the intelligence-gathering tools outlined in the Law Commission‘s 
report, the executive branch issued the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 2001, a temporary 
ordinance which put into place the recommended tools.  POTA was enacted in March, 2002,
37
  
                                                                                                                                                             
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/13/newsid_3695000/3695057.stm (last visited June 6, 
2008). 
32
 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2002, at §§ 43, 45, 49, 52. 
33
 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act of 2001, Pub.L. 107-56,115 Stat. 272, at tit. II, § 218, tit. IX, § 901. 
34
 Indian Law Commission, 173
rd
 report (April 2000). 
35
 The Law Commission is a non-partisan group of lawyers and judges commissioned by the central government to 
offer advice and proposals for legal reform.  See Indian Law Commission, How Does the Commission Function?, 
available at http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/main.htm#HOW_DOES_THE_COMMISSION_FUNCTION? 
(last visited May 5, 2008). 
36
 Id. (noting that the proposed reform is ―sent out for circulation in the public and concerned interest groups with a 
view to eliciting reactions and suggestions.  Usually a carefully prepared questionnaire is also sent with the 
document. The Law Commission has been anxious to ensure that the widest section of people [is] consulted in 
formulating proposals for law reforms. In this process, partnerships are established with professional bodies and 
academic institutions. Seminars and workshops are organised in different parts of the country to elicit critical 
opinion on proposed strategies for reform‖). 
37




but was met with a great deal of opposition from human rights advocates and opposing political 
parties.
38
  In response, the Home Minister of India claimed that opponents to the measure were 
assisting the terrorists,
39
 rhetoric that mirrors the public discourse within the United States in 
response to the Patriot Act, as well as the legal policy developed by the U.S. executive branch at 
that time.  POTA became a driving issue in the 2004 parliamentary election.  The Congress 
Party, then a minority political party, ran on the promise to repeal POTA because of the law‘s 
enabling of abuses of human rights and civil liberties.
40
  When the Congress Party won the 2004 




No secret law exists in terms of Indian antiterrorism policies; instead, they are generated 
with a significant level of publicity and public accountability.
42
  This publicity led to public and 
parliamentary support for POTA in 2002; that same publicity and public accounting led to the 
repeal of the Act in 2004.  Whatever the content of anti-terror policies, the process of Indian 
policy-making demonstrates the ability to define the scope of—and legal comfort offered by—






Israel has dealt with serious national security issues since its founding in 1948, with 
scores of people dying each year in various types of attacks, including suicide bombings, car 
bombs, and kidnappings.
44
  Israel‘s antiterrorism efforts, including the techniques used by 
Israel‘s General Security Service in interrogating detainees suspected of terrorist activities, are 
authorized broadly by Article 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Statute and the government‘s 
general and residual powers under Article 40 of the Basic Law (Government). 
 
The legal treatment of specific interrogation techniques used by the General Security 
Services is fundamentally different from how OLC memoranda treat the same issue.  The 
authority of the General Security Service to employ certain interrogation techniques was 
                                                 
38
 C. Raj Kumar, Human Rights Implications of National Security Laws in India: Combating Terrorism While 
Preserving Civil Liberties, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL‘Y 195, 196 (2005). 
39
 Kalhan, supra note 27, at 152. 
40
 Id. at 152, 190. 
41
 Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004, No. 26, Acts of Parliament, 2004.  In response to the November 2008 
terrorist attack in Mumbai that killed over 150 people and the public outrage that followed, many provisions of 
POTA were reintroduced in proposed legislation.  See Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill, 2008; 
National Investigation Agency Bill, 2008.  See also Somini Sengupta, Dossier Gives Details of Mumbai Attacks, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 2009, at A5 (describing November 2008 attacks in Mumbai). 
42
 See also Right to Information Act, 2005 (containing provisions similar to FOIA, including an exemption for a 
deliberative privilege, but not for adopted policies). 
43
 Although a number of acts of terrorism have occurred in India in the last several years, no credible argument has 
been made that the publication of India‘s legal policies surrounding national security is one of the bases for attacks 
occurring. 
44
 H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Government of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, at ¶ 1 (1999) (―The 
State of Israel has been engaged in an unceasing struggle for both its very existence and security, from the day of its 
founding‖); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and Israeli Experiences, 




examined by the Israeli Commission of Inquiry,
45
 which concluded in 1995 that the General 
Security Service had the authority to interrogate suspects using certain physical techniques, and 
established the availability of a post factum defense of ―necessity‖ for interrogators who engaged 




The General Security Service interpreted the necessity defense broadly; like various OLC 
memoranda, the necessity defense was interpreted internally such that interrogators were given 
broad legal comfort that they could not be prosecuted for torturing terrorism suspects so long as 
they were doing so in an effort to preserve national security.
47
  But unlike the similar Office of 
Legal Counsel memoranda, this interpretation of the necessity defense was not kept secret from 




In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, human rights 
groups and individual detainees challenged the blanket reading of the necessity defense based on 
rule of law and human rights concerns.  The court, with some reservations given Israel‘s national 
security issues, unanimously held that broad legal comfort to protect interrogators who torture 
suspects was unacceptable under Israeli Basic Law.
49
 The court struggled with several national 
priorities:  
 
―[w]e are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with that 
harsh reality [of Israel‘s security issues].  This is the destiny of 
democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and not all 
practices employed by its enemies are open before it.  Although a 
democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it 
nonetheless has the upper hand.  Preserving the Rule of Law and 
recognition of an individual‘s liberty constitutes an important 
component in its understanding of security.‖
50
   
 
The High Court, however, affirmed the availability of a necessity defense for individual 
interrogators being prosecuted for using such techniques during a perceived national security 
emergency, but rejected the argument put forth by the Israeli government, which parallels the 
arguments set forth in various Office of Legal Counsel memoranda, that blanket immunity ought 
to apply to the interrogators‘ actions.
51
 
                                                 
45
 The Commission of Inquiry, which undertakes investigations of government actions, was convened under the 
authority of the Commission of Inquiry Statute in 1968. 
46
 The techniques at issue included harsh shaking which, in one instance, led to the death of the detainee; prolonged 
detention in stress positions; exposure to extreme temperatures; and covering the detainee‘s head with a vomit-
covered hood.  H.C. 5100/94 at ¶¶ 2, 8-13, 15, 19. 
47
 Id. at ¶¶ 8, 15-17 . 
48
 Id. at ¶¶ 8 (―The decision to utilize physical means [in interrogation]…is based on internal regulations, which 
requires obtaining permission from various ranks of the [Security Services] hierarchy.  The regulations themselves 
were approved by a special Ministerial Committee…[t]he Committee set forth directives pertaining to the rank 
authorized to allow these interrogation practices); ¶17 (―The [Security Services‘] authority to employ particular 
interrogation methods, and the relevant law respecting these matters were examined by the Commission of Inquiry 
(whose report was published, as mentioned, in the Landau Book)‖). 
49
 Id. at ¶¶ 38-40 .   
50
 Id. at ¶ 39. 
51




The Public Committee Against Torture decision illustrates how Israel navigated the 
tension between adhering to the rule of law and maximizing national security efforts, particularly 
with respect to making public the legal policies and parameters under which the General Security 
Service interrogators were acting. 
 
C. United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) has dealt with significant internal and external threats to 
national security for many decades.  A central influence on the development of the UK‘s modern 
national security regime was the violent conflicts, known as ―The Troubles,‖ in Northern Ireland, 
which escalated in the late 1960s and were largely resolved only in 1998, with the signing of the 
Belfast Agreement.
52
  During The Troubles, almost 3,000 people were killed and over 30,000 
were seriously injured.
53
  More recently, the UK has been confronted with international terrorist 
threats, including an attack on the London mass transit system in July 2005 which killed 56 




UK law has vacillated in terms of trying to maintain a balance among the interests of 
national security, civil rights and liberties, and the rule of law.  Complicating matters is that the 
UK is under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and that detainees 




As in India, Israel, and the United States, the British Prime Minister is endowed with 
war-making power as a legacy of a historical Crown prerogative; nevertheless, he or she almost 
always seeks authorization of the Parliament to act.
56
  Additionally, UK law and constitutional 
norms require that emergency powers be exercised in a legal framework involving the 
Parliament and the courts,
57
 a striking contrast to the Bush administration‘s vision of wartime 
decision-making as solely within the purview of the President. 
 
The mandatory involvement of the legislature and nature of British parliamentary 
supremacy has ensured that executive branch legal policy does not unilaterally determine how 
national security interests are going to be balanced with constitutional constraints.   The role of 
the legislative body also ensures that debate and passage (as widely publicized and generally 
televised) face public scrutiny and the political accountability that such scrutiny allows.  The role 
of Parliament has forced the Prime Minister to pass legislation in order to deal with particular 
situations in the war on terror; for example, in November 2005 former Prime Minister Tony Blair 
                                                 
52
 Belfast Agreement, Ir.-U.K., Apr. 10, 1998, available at 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm#support (last visited June 10, 2008). 
53
 Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 1933. 
54
 House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, 2006H.C. 
1087, at 2. 
55
 Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 1943. 
56
 Matthew Tempest, Government Kills Short’s War Bill, GUARDIAN, Oct. 21, 2005 (London), 
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956, 1597883,00.html. 
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was unable to pass legislation that would allow the government to detain terrorism suspects for 
up to 90 days without being charged because the House of Commons, led by Blair‘s own Labour 




Further, since the United Kingdom‘s acceptance of the jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR), the judicial check on executive exercise of national security powers is 
a robust one: domestic judicial review is available for all national security-related legal policy, 
even in times of war, including challenges to the treatment of individual detainees.  The 2004 
decision of A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
59
 illustrated that British courts will 
act decisively to counteract national security laws—in that case, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 





Finally, U.K. accountability on national security law and policy is bolstered by a series of 
independent reviews authorized by the House of Commons in which a member of the House of 
Lords was granted the necessary security clearance and a mandate to make independent reports 
on the operation of the Terrorism Act, 2000 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005.
61
  Those 






IV. Is There Still a Need for Reform? 
 
Given that the Obama administration appears committed to greater transparency and 
assuming internal constraints can be re-established to maintain impartiality and best practices, is 
it still necessary to advocate for Office of Legal Counsel reform?
64
  In order to establish long-
term process protections for the rule of law, I assert that external structural constraints, 
particularly transparency requirements, continue to be necessary. This is particularly true when 
both houses of Congress and the President belong to the same political party—if Congress does 
not have the political will to exercise oversight of the OLC during any given administration, 
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mandated disclosure can and will serve as a backstop.
65
  Further, politicization and political 
pressure may be inevitable in times of war.  Politicization that leads to self-interested actions, 
such as keeping secret potentially controversial legal policies, highlights the need for 
institutionalized checks and balances such as mandated disclosure. 
 
Instituting an internal model of best practices at OLC might not suffice, since asking 
OLC lawyers to adhere to a particular model of best practices may be futile if those lawyers 
already believe that they are adhering to best practices with regard to their legal analysis.
66
  
Various Justice Department officials from the Bush administration made clear that they believe 
that the legal opinions drafted by the OLC were done so in good faith and through the best 
possible interpretation of the law.
67
  Jack Goldsmith, former head of the OLC and a strong critic 
of some tactics of the Bush administration, stated that everyone he dealt with in the Bush 
administration ―thought they were doing the right thing‖ in developing OLC legal opinions.
68
  
The belief that a different set of principles will once again prevail in the OLC and the 
administration, without further measures to ensure greater information disclosure, inherently 
assumes that the breakdown of previous OLC norms is peculiar to one administration and will 
not recur in the future.
69
   
 
The question that remains after all of the hand-wringing over the Bush administration 
politicization of the OLC is whether President Obama and every future president will be 
successful in re-establishing OLC objectivity and best practices, in which case the information 
disclosure problems highlighted here may not need to be addressed further.  However, future 
presidents may find it helpful and self-serving to use the Bush administration as precedent to 
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cement the aggregation of executive power
70
 and limit access to Office of Legal Counsel legal 
policy whenever it becomes expedient to do so, in which case we must consider whether 
additional structural or institutional measures will be helpful to improve the quality of Office of 
Legal Counsel opinions while maintaining the integrity of sensitive national security programs to 
which some legal opinions relate.  As one Bush administration critic put it, ―What was once 






This Issue Brief does not prescribe a single solution to the problem of ensuring 
objectivity, transparency, and political accountability in OLC opinions.  However, I argue that, at 
the very least, we should discard the notion that transparency in the law is impossible for a nation 
facing serious national security concerns.  A look at just a small sampling of nations—India, 
Israel, and the U.K.—that face threats of terrorism shows that secret law is not necessary. 
 
Of course, questions might be raised about the overall effectiveness of the national 
security policies in India, Israel, and the United Kingdom compared to the United States, and 
there is always the possibility that, despite our understanding that nations are adhering to the rule 
of law (through court decisions, governmental statements, and legislative oversight), a nation is 
actually secretly developing contrary national security policies. However, if such secret policy 
exists in these other countries, there is no indication that those policies would provide legal 
comfort against future prosecution.  Further, although the models of developing national security 
legal policy in other nations do not have direct applicability to US policy, in grappling with how 
to balance transparency and national security concerns, the US can and should look beyond its 
borders to examine how other nations have fashioned solutions.  
 
The politicization of the OLC during the Bush administration, when combined with the 
predictable self-interest of any administration in not voluntarily disclosing its own legal policies, 
suggests that structural change should be considered to ensure greater long-term transparency 
and adherence to the rule of law.   Broad structural change would permit the objectivity, 
integrity, and transparency of OLC opinions to be vouchsafed from administration to 
administration.  Such change is necessary to restore the rule of law and the standing of the U.S. 
as a nation that is a standard bearer for democratic principles.
72
  Eliminating the existence of 
secret laws which provide legal comfort and restoring the democratic principles of the 
application of law are two important means of doing so, and the experiences of other countries 
should suggest to us that making such changes are possible. 
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